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Abstract
The question over whether resource abundance or scarcity is an important cause of conflict
has been a lively area of research. We examine this question in a simple trade-theoretic model
where two regions are in conflict and where war equilibrium is determined endogenously.
We find that while abundance of uncontested natural resources discourages conflict (the
Malthusian view), abundance of contested natural resources encourages conflict. We also
show that when the warring regions have influence over the terms of trade and take this
influence into account when deciding war efforts, the effect of endowments on conflict may
be strengthened or weakened depending on factor intensities of production and the relative
strength of income and substitution effects.
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Introduction

Wars — both international and civil — unfortunately are more common than one would
like.1 What are the economic sources of such conflict? In the literature, one finds many
attempts at explanations, one of which is in terms of resource abundance or scarcity. This
paper takes a fresh look at this particular explanation.
The traditional view going back to Malthus is that a low level of resources relative to
the size of the population leads to conflict because of a shortage of, and entitlement to, basic
necessities that a scarcity of resources entail.2 Recently, in a series of interesting papers
Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) point out that an abundance of resources can actually
be the cause of conflicts, even though it increases income. The hypothesis that they put
forward is that there is an additional channel through which resources affect conflict, and
this channel works in the opposite direction of the traditional explanation.3 Collier and
Hoeffler emphasize the benefit of conflict to the rebels from looting resources (the greed or
opportunity motivation) as opposed to traditional explanations that emphasize inequities
and relative deprivation as source of conflict (the grievance motivation).
Though there exists enough informal evidence to support the Malthusian scarcityconflict nexus, Grossman and Mendoza (2003) argue that it is difficult to show analytically
using formal conflict models that scarcity increases warfare. In this paper, we show that it
is indeed possible to explain analytically both the positive and negative effects of resource
endowments on conflict. We do so by building on a theoretical literature on war and conflict
1

According to Gleditsch (2004), there have been 450 international and civil wars between 1816 and 2002.
Civil wars have steadily increased since World War II and are now the predominant form of violent conflict
in the world. Most of the civil wars of the past generation or two have occured in developing countries.
This is not to say that international wars between developing countries are rare. India, for example, has
been involved in three major wars with Pakistan and one with China, disputed borders being the casus belli
for all four cases.
2
See, for example, Tilly (1975), Dreze and Sen (1989), Homer-Dixon (1999), Grossman and Mendoza
(2003), and Diamond (2005).
3
The Collier-Hoeffler approach has been to show that the share of primary commodity exports in GDP
— which is taken to be a proxy of the degree of resource abundance — is positively associated with conflict
even after controlling for income and income growth. There is now a sizeable literature that debates the
Collier-Hoeffler approach (for recent examples see Lederman and Maloney, 2003; Ross, 2004; Fearon, 2005;
Blattman, 2005; Stijns, 2005).
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that describes a war equilibrium by analytically spelling out the marginal costs and benefits
of war activities in terms of the opportunity costs of conflict (the value of resources used
in fighting) and the benefits of conflict (the value of the prize).4 With such an equilibrium
established, we show that it is very important to distinguish between disputed and undisputed resources in the analysis of conflicts. In particular, we find that whereas an abundance
of undisputed resource reduces conflict (the traditional Malthusian view), an abundance of
disputed resource does just the opposite (the Collier-Hoeffler view).
We develop a unified framework that has two or three regions that produce, consume,
and trade goods. Two regions may choose to direct resources from productive activity to
war, where conflict is over a productive input. Specifically, regions are endowed with labor,
which may be used for production or warfare, and land (or natural resources), which is also
used for production but may either be contested or uncontested (or disputed or undisputed).
Production is characterized by incomplete specialization. The conflict equilibrium is specified
as a Nash one where each warring region decides on the level of its war activity by equating
the marginal costs of conflict with the marginal benefit of conflict taking the war activity
of the other region and prices as given. Contested land acts as a prize for the conflict
with predatory activity determining how it is allocated between the warring parties, while
the opportunity cost of conflict is given by the wages of productive employment. Factor
endowments influence the relative size of costs and benefits of warfare and thus conflict.
It is to be noted that the hypothesis that an abundance of a resource can have a
perverse effect is not new; the so-called Dutch Disease phenomenon is precisely that (see,
for example, Corden, 1984; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; and Humphreys, 2005.)5,6 The
4
A growing literature follows the seminal work of Hirshleifer (1988 and 1991) and develops game-theoretic
models where two rival groups allocate resources between productive and appropriative activities (see, for
example, Grossman, 1991; Skaperdas, 1991; Grossman and Kim, 1995; and Neary, 1997). Recent contributions emphasize the connections between trade and war, where trade is seen as a peaceful way to gain access
to foreign resources and war is seen as its violent counterpart. Trade theoretic models with conflict have
either used a two country framewok (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001) or a three country framework (Becsi
and Lahiri, 2004; Syropoulos, 2004).
5
It is also closely related to the phenomenon of immizerizing growth (Bhagwati, 1958).
6
Some have emphasized that the instability produced by volatile natural resource prices may be also
be driving conflict. Though there do not exist formal models that connect volatility and conflict directly,
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primary mechanism by which perverse outcomes occur is the price mechanism: changes in
relative prices caused by factor abundance may increase distortions in the economy and
this may outweigh the benefits. An increase the endowment of a resource, for example,
may increase cash crop production which in turn may crowd out food production, with the
resulting scarcity of food leading to conflict. In this paper, first of all, we show that resource
abundance can have both positive and negative effects on conflict when goods prices are
exogenous. We then endogenize the terms of trade, and show that the additional effect
which endogenous terms of trade brings in can either mitigate or accentuate the earlier
effects depending on factor intensities of production and on the magnitude of income and
substitution effects.
The lay out of the paper is as follows. The following section sets up the basic model
and carries out some initial analysis. The effect of resources on conflict are then analyzed
in section 3 and 4, the two sections considering cases of small and large open economies
respectively. Finally, in section 5 we make some concluding remarks.

2

Model and Initial Analysis

We develop a three-region, two-good, many-factor model where two of the regions — labeled
region a and region b — are engaged in a war with each other. The third region is the rest
of the world. All product and factor markets are perfectly competitive. There are many
inelastically supplied factors of production; however, two of the factors play important roles
in our analysis. For expositional ease, we shall call these factors labor and land although one
could interpret them differently. Labor that is not used in production is used to fight the
war and land is what they fight for. Each region i (i = a, b) has an amount of land V̄ i that is
undisputed, and the war is about a disputed amount of land denoted by D. For simplicity
and without loss of any generality we shall assume that the disputed land is initially in
Hausman and Rigobon (2003) show how resource price volatility and economic growth can be connected,
which provides an indirect avenue for conflict.
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possession of region b. Regions fight over the disputed land by employing soldiers Las and Lbs
and ultimately divide the disputed land on the basis of a ‘contest-success’ function f (Las , Lbs )
which is the share of D going to region a. For this net-gain function we make the following
assumptions.

Assumption 1 f (·) is homogeneous of degree zero in the two arguments and satisfies:7
f1 > 0, f2 < 0, f11 < 0, f22 > 0. .

The production side of the economies indexed by i = a, b is described the revenue
functions Ra (p, L̄a − Las , V̄ a + f (Las , Lbs )D) and Rb (p, L̄b − Lbs , V̄ b + {1 − f (Las , Lbs )}D), where
p is the international price of the non-numeraire goods.8 To start with, we assume the two
warring regions to be small open economies so that p is exogenous to these two regions (it
is determined in the rest of the world). In section 4 we shall follow Becsi and Lahiri (2004)
and allow p to be determined endogenously in a three-country framework. The revenue
function has the property that its partial derivative with respect to the price R1i is equal to
i
the region’s supply function and that supply increases with the price, or R11
> 0. Also, the

partial derivative of the revenue function with respect to the factor endowment levels L̄i and
V̄ i are the region’s inverse factor demand functions, which express the regions’ factor returns
as functions of exogenous and endogenous variables. Factor endowments tend to decrease
i
i
factor returns in each region i, or R22
< 0 and R33
< 0. We also assume that the two factors
i
are complements in each region, or R23
> 0.

Assumption 2

a
>0
R23

and

Formally,

b
> 0.
R23

7

The sign of f12 is in general ambiguous. If the function f takes the form f (Las , Lbs ) = (g(Las )/(g(Las ) +
a ≥ b
g(Lbs ))D, where g 0 > 0 and D is the amount of disputed land, we have f12 ≥
< 0 if and only if Ls < Ls . In
particular, if the warring countries are symmetric, then f12 = 0.
8
All factors other than land and labor are suppressed in the revenue functions as they do not change in
our analysis. As is well known the partial derivative of a revenue function with respect to the price of a good
R1i gives the output supply function of that good. Similarly, the partial derivatives of a revenue function,
R2i and R3i , with respect to a factor endowment give the price of that factor. The revenue functions are
positive semi-definite in prices and negative semi-definite in the endowments of the factors of production. In
i
particular, they satisfy Rjj
≤ 0, for i = a, b and j = 2, 3. For these and other properties of revenue functions
see Dixit and Norman (1980).
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The consumption side of the economies is represented by the expenditure function
E i (p, ui ), where ui is the utility level of a representative consumer in region i. The partial
derivative of the expenditure function with respect to the price of a good E1i gives the
i
compensated individual demand function of that good, which falls when prices rise, or E11
<

0. The partial derivative E2i is the reciprocal of the individual’s marginal utility of income
i
and goods are assumed to be normal, or E12
> 0.

The income-expenditure balance equations of consumers in the regions are given by:
L̄a E a (p, ua ) = Ra (p, L̄a − Las , V̄ a + f (Las , Lbs )D),
¡
¢
L̄b E b p, ub = Rb (p, L̄b − Lbs , V̄ b + {1 − f (Las , Lbs )}D),

(1)
(2)

Implicitly, we have assumed that wages paid to soldiers are paid for by taxing the representative consumer.
To determine the war efforts in the two warring regions, Las and Lbs , we follow Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and assume that each warring region chooses its own war effort
to maximize its welfare, taking war effort in the other region and the international prices of
the non-numeraire good as given. The first order conditions are given by:
∂ua
=0
∂Las

=⇒

−R2a + R3a f1 D = 0,

(3)

∂ub
=0
∂Lbs

=⇒

−R2b − R3b f2 D = 0.

(4)

An increase in Lis , ceteris paribus, increases income in region i (i = a, b) by increasing
the amount of land, but it also has a cost in the sense that it reduces the amount of labor than
can be used for producing goods and services. The first term in (3) and (4) is the marginal
cost of warfare and the second term is the marginal benefit. Equating marginal costs and
benefits yields two reaction functions in the warring regions that are simultaneously solved.
This completes the description of the basic model. There are four endogenous variables, Las , Lbs , ua and ub , and these variables are solved from the four equations (1)-(4).
5

We conclude this section by deriving our basic welfare equations. Differentiating
equations (1) and (2) and using (3) and (4), we obtain
L̄a E2a dua = −ma dp + (R2a − E a ) dL̄a + R3a dV̄ a + R3a f dD + R3a Df2 dLbs ,
¡
¢
L̄b E2b dub = −mb dp + R2b − E b dL̄b + R3b dV̄ b + R3b (1 − f )dD − R3b f1 DdLas ,

(5)
(6)

where the excess demand function
mi = L̄i E1i − R1i

(7)

represents the imports of the non-numeraire good by region i (i = a, b).
The first term on the right hand side of (5) and (6) gives the direct terms-of trade
effect on utility, while the second, third and fourth terms give the direct effect of endowments.
The last term gives the international externality of war effort on the two warring regions.
Higher war effort by one region, ceteris paribus, reduces utility in the other warring region
by reducing the endowment of land in the latter. However, higher war effort in a region
has no effect on its own welfare, as war effort is optimally chosen. The direct effects of land
endowments — both disputed and undisputed — on welfare are positive. However, the effect
of an increase in labor endowment in region i increases welfare in that region if and only if
R2i − E i > 0. The positive effect (R2i ) is due to the income-generating effect of the additional
labor, and the negative effect (E i ) is due to the fact that there are more people to share
income.9
The two regions in our model can be two countries (in which case the war is an international one), or they can be interpreted as two different regions within a country (in
which case the conflict is a civil war). However, this interpretation should not be taken to
imply that the present model can explain all types of civil war which can be very heterogeneous. The type of civil wars that we model are those where the warring groups live in two
distinct regions in a country with no mobility of labor between the two regions, and they
9
If land and labor are the only two factors of production and f (·) = Las /(Las + Lbs ), then it can be shown
that R2i − E i is in fact negative.
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fight over the ownership of a factor of production. There are some civil wars which satisfy
the stylized facts of our model. For example, in the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka the warring
groups are restricted geographically with the Tamil rebels living mostly in the Jaffna region
in the north of the country and with very limited mobility of labor. In other words, we are
interested in conflicts with a sufficient amount of spatial separation or polarization amongst
the population. Furthermore, for the civil war interpretation, we do not distinguish which
side is the government side and which side is the rebel side. We assume that there is some
form of governance for each side which can raise funds through taxation.

3

Resources and war: the case of small open economies

In this section we examine the effect of various shocks on the war efforts of the two warring
regions. We focus on what happens when the endowments of one of the regions are altered.
Differentiation of the reaction functions of the warring regions (3) and (4) results in:
a
a
a
a
α1 dLas + α2 dLbs = [R22
− f1 DR23
]dL̄a + [R23
− f1 DR33
]dV̄ a − f1 R3a θa dD,

(8)

α3 dLas + α4 dLbs = f2 R3b θb dD,

(9)

where
a
a
a
α1 = R22
− 2f1 DR23
+ R3a Df11 + (f1 D)2 R33
< 0,
a
a
α2 = −R23
Df2 + R3a Df12 + f1 f2 D2 R33
,
b
b
α3 = R23
Df1 − R3b Df21 + f1 f2 D2 R33
,
b
b
b
α4 = R22
+ 2f2 DR23
− R3b Df22 + (f2 D)2 R33
< 0,

θa = 1 − ²a33 ·

fD
(1 − f )D
, θb = 1 − ²b33 · a
,
V̄ + f D
V̄ + (1 − f )D
a

²a33 = −

a
V̄ a + f D
(V̄ a + f D)
∂R3a
R33
·
=
−
,
R3a
R3a
∂(V̄ a + f D)

²b33 = −

b
V̄ b + (1 − f )D
(V̄ b + (1 − f )D)
∂R3b
R33
·
=
−
.
R3b
R3b
∂(V̄ b + (1 − f )D)
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Note that α1 < 0 and α4 < 0 because of the second order conditions in the determination of Las and Lbs respectively. We assume that α3 > 0 and α2 > 0 so that both reaction
functions are upward sloping and employment of soldiers is a strategic complement in both
regions.10 We also make the realistic assumption that that the ratio of disputed land to total
amount of land endowment is sufficiently small so that θa > 0 and θb > 0.11 Formally,
Assumption 3

θa > 0

and

θb > 0.

Solving (8) and (9), we obtain for the endowment shocks:
a
a
∂Las
α4 [R22
− f1 DR23
]
> 0,
=
∆s
∂ L̄a

a
a
∂Lbs
α3 [R22
− f1 DR23
]
> 0,
=
−
∆s
∂ L̄a

(10)

a
a
∂Las
α4 [R23
− f1 DR33
]
=
< 0,
a
∆s
∂ V̄

a
a
∂Lbs
α3 [R23
− f1 DR33
]
=
−
< 0,
a
∆s
∂ V̄

(11)

∂Las
−R3a f1 α4 θa − f2 R3b α2 θb
∂Lbs
Rb α1 f2 θb + α3 f1 R3a θa
=
> 0,
= 3
> 0.
∂D
∆s
∂D
∆s

(12)

where ∆s = α1 α4 − α2 α3 > 0 for the stability of the Nash equilibrium.
From (10) it follows that when the labor endowment in region a rises or the land
endowment falls, competition for scarce resources intensifies and the reaction function of
region a shifts up. The intuition is that an increase in the endowment of labor decreases the
wage rate which lowers the opportunity cost of soldiers and thus increases warfare. Similarly,
from (11) we find that an increase in the undisputed land endowment reduces the return
to land relative to the wage rate, which raises the opportunity cost of soldiers and thus
decreases warfare. In other words, war effort in both regions increases when labor becomes
more abundant relative to undisputed land in any one region. However, from (12) we also find
than a reduction in the amount of disputed land decreases warfare. A decrease in disputed
land — like that in undisputed land — increases the return to land and thus the level of
10

Note that when the two countries are symmetric and f (·) = g(Las )/(g(Las ) + g(Lbs )), we have f21 = 0 and
in this case α2 and α3 are indeed positive.
11
When civil conflict encompasses all land in the two regions, we have V̄ a = V̄ b = 0 and θi = 1 − ²i33 . In
this case the assumption requires ²i33 which measures the responsiveness of the rental rate of land to the net
endowment of land, is less than unity.
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warfare. However, it also decreases the stake, i.e., potential gain for a given rental rate of
land (the greed or opportunity motivation in Collier and Hoeffler (2004)). This second effect
would dominate if the share of disputed land is sufficiently small, an assumption that we
have made. Thus, changes in the endowment of disputed and undisputed land have very
different effects on the level of warfare. Formally,

Proposition 1 An increase in the amount of undisputed land or a decrease in the endowment of labor or disputed land in a region unambiguously decreases the level of warfare in
both countries.

This result formalizes the Malthusian observation that population pressures or lack of
natural resources in one region encourages warfare. Because disputed land is the prize in the
conflict, more disputed land encourages conflict as well (the Collier-Hoeffler effect). That
is, whether resource abundance encourages conflicts depends on if the resource is disputed
or undisputed. Our results are also consistent with Neary (1997) who shows that conflict
tends to increase with wealth in equilibrium conflict models. In these models wealth can
be used either for production or warfare, which is analogous to the role played by the labor
endowment in our model.
Turning to welfare effects, from (5) and (6) we find that shocks to the endowments
in region a have the following effects. For an increase of the undisputed land endowment in
region a, which can be interpreted as a discovery of natural resources or better extraction
technology, the results are clear. Because war effort falls in both regions, conflict is reduced
which has a positive indirect effect on welfare. This positive indirect effect reinforces the
direct welfare gain in region a that occurs when any endowment increases. By contrast, the
welfare effects are ambiguous for an increase in the labor endowment in region a , which can
be interpreted as a population increase relative to region b. However, when R2a − E a < 0 an
increase in labor endowment in a region will reduce welfare levels in both countries.12 Thus,
12

As shown in footnote 9, there are realistic situations when R2a − E a will be negative.
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we have

Proposition 2 An increase in the undisputed land endowment of a region causes welfare
to increase in both regions. The effect of an increase in disputed land endowment in general
have ambiguous effects on welfare levels in the two regions. The effect of an increase in labor
endowment in a region has negative effect on welfare levels in the other region, and has an
ambiguous effect on its own welfare.

4

The case of large open economies

In this section we relax the small open economy assumption of the preceding section and thus
treat the price of the non-numeraire good endogenously. Given the chance, the embattled
regions may want to influence the terms-of-trade in their favor through any means, peaceful
or not. By this view, conflict is not only about gaining access to resources but also about
greater control over the terms of trade.
With endogenous terms of trade, we assume for simplicity that the excess demand
function of the non-numeraire good in the rest of the world is given by mc (p) with mcp ≤ 0.
The following market-clearing conditions determines p:
ma + mb + mc = 0,

(13)

where ma and mb are defined in (7).
We now extend the war equilibrium given by (3) and (4) to the case where p is
endogenous. Here we assume that each warring region decides on the levels of its soldiers
— Las and Lbs for the two countries — taking the amount of soldiers in the other region as
given, but taking into account the effect of its own action on the terms of trade. Under these

10

circumstances, the first order conditions are given by
E2a

∂ua
∂p
= −R2a + R3a f1 − ma a = 0,
a
∂Ls
∂Ls

(14)

E2b

∂ub
∂p
= −R2b − R3b f2 − mb b = 0,
b
∂Ls
∂Ls

(15)

where the determination of ∂p/∂Lis (i = a, b) will be taken up shortly.
Equations (14) and (15) give the reaction functions of both countries when they have
influence over the terms of trade. Compared to (3) and (4) (the case of small open economy),
each region has to take into account, while deciding on the level of warfare, the marginal
effect of its action on world prices. Countries internalize the effect of world prices when
committing soldiers to war by adding a second term to the marginal cost of warfare. For
large open economies the marginal cost of warfare equals the loss in productive wages, R2i ,
plus the higher cost of imports if warfare increases world prices, mi (∂p/∂Lis ).
For the rest of the paper, and mainly for ease of analysis, we shall assume that the
two warring countries are identical in every respect so that Las = Lbs = Ls (say), f1 = −f2 ,
f12 = 0 (see footnote 7), and f (·) = 0. For the rest of the paper, because of the symmetry,
we shall shall use the superscripts a for both countries. The assumption is plausible for many
civil war scenarios, because as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show polarization and inequality
between nations do not appear to be major determinants of civil conflict.
Totally differentiating (1), (2) and (13), we derive
a
∆ dp = 2β a dLas + [−(E1a − R12
) + cay (E a − R2a )] dL̄a
a
a
+[R13
− cay R3a ] dV̄ a + [R13
− cay R3a ] dD,

where

a
β a = −R12
+ cay R2a ,

¡ a
¢
b
∆ = 2 E11
− R11
+ mcp − 2cay ma ,

(16)

cay =

a
E12
,
E2a

and dL̄a and dV̄ a are the changes in the endowments of labor and land in one of the two
warring countries. The term ∆ is the slope of the uncompensated excess demand function
11

of the non-numeraire good, which has to be negative for Walrasian stability. The term cay is
the marginal propensity to consume the non-numeraire good in the two warring countries.
The partial effects of a region’s war efforts on the terms of trade (∂p/∂Las ) is represented by β a and is ambiguous a priori, because an increase in war effort has two countervailing effects. An increase in the employment of soldiers Las reduces the supply of workers for
a
the private sector and this reduces output of the non-numeraire good if and only if R12
> 0.

The reduction in output will increase p by reducing the world supply of the non-numeraire
good. The first term in β a captures this effect. Moreover, an increase in Las also has a negative income effect on p that comes from a reduction in employment in the private sector. We
note that the assumption of symmetry implies that ultimately there is no actual transfer of
land so that the effects through war-induced changes in land endowments are absent.
An increase in the amount of disputed land raises the output of the non-numeraire
a
good in the warring countries, and thus reduces the price, if and only if R13
> 0. An increase

in D also has a positive income effect via increases in total rental income on land. This
income effect unambiguously increases the price. An increase in the amount of undisputed
land V̄ or labor endowment L̄ in either region a or b also has similar output supply and
income effects.
Using the equilibrium price response from (16), we can rewrite the Nash reaction
function in (14) under the assumption of symmetry as
−R2a Φ + R3a f1 = 0,
where

Φ = 1−
²am =

(17)

²a12 ˜
p∆
, ∆ = a = 2²am − 2²cm − 2pcay ,
˜
m
∆

∂ma p
·
,
∂p ma

²cm =

∂mc p
Ra p
· c , ²a12 = 12a ,
∂p m
R2

where ²a12 is the elasticity of the wage rate of productive labor with respect to the price of the
non-numeraire good, and ²im is the price elasticity of import demand of the non-numeraire
good in region i (i = a, b, c).
12

The term R2a Φ is now the combined marginal cost of warfare including the effect of
warfare on world prices. For small open economies Φ = 1, but for large open economies Φ ≶ 1
depending on whether warfare increases or decreases the world price of the non-numeraire
good. If warfare increases p and ma < 0, it follows that Φ < 1 and the marginal cost of
warfare is less than the loss of productive wages because of a gain from the terms-of-trade
improvement.
Differentiating (17) and treating Φ as a constant, we obtain
∆s dLs = [ΦR21 − f1 R31 ] dp + [ΦR22 − f1 R32 ] dL̄a
+[ΦR23 − f1 R33 ] dV̄ a − R3 f1 dD,

(18)

where ∆s = ΦR22 − f1 R23 + R3 f11 < 0.
Before we discuss the above equation, it will be useful to introduce the concept of
labor and land intensity. In a many-good, many-factor model, the terminology labor intensive
can be misleading. In this paper, we call the non-numeraire good more labor intensive if
a
a
ΦR12
− f1 R13
> 0. In other words, if an increase in the labor endowment, or a decrease in

the land endowment, increases the output of the non-numeraire good, this condition will be
satisfied and the non-numeraire good is called labor intensive. Land-intensity is similarly
defined. Formally,

Definition 1 The two warring regions are labor (land) intensive in the production of the
a
a
a
a
non-numeraire good if ΦR12
− f1 R13
> 0 (ΦR12
− f1 R13
< 0).

Comparing equation (18) with its small open economy analog (8), we find that we have
an additional term that represents the terms of trade effect; the direct effects are qualitatively
the same as before. The terms of trade effect — the first term on the right hand side of
(18)— says that an increase in p reduces war efforts if and only if the non-numeraire good is
labor intensive. The reason for this result is that an increase in p increases the net marginal
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cost of war if and only if the the non-numeraire good is labor intensive. Thus, the terms of
trade effect make war more or less likely by shifting the balance between the marginal cost
of war and marginal benefit of war.
Substituting (18) in (16) and invoking symmetry we can write
a
a
a ¸
(cay R2a − R12
)(ΦR23
− f1 R33
)
˜ dp = 2
dV̄ a
∆
−
+
∆s
·
¸
a
2(cay R2a − R12
)R3a f1
a
a a
+ R13 − cy R3 −
dD
(19)
∆s
·
a
a
a ¸
(cay R2a − R12
)(ΦR22
− f1 R32
)
a
a
a
a
a
+2 {−(E1 − R12 ) + cy (E − R2 )} +
dL̄a ,
∆s

·

a
(R13

cay R3a )

where

a
a
a
˜ = ∆ + 2β (ΦR21 − f1 R31 ) < 0,
∆
∆s

˜ has to be negative for the Walrasian stability of goods market.
and ∆
As compared to (16), changes in the endowment of each resource now has an additional term which comes from changes in equilibrium war efforts. Using (18) and (19) and
comparing with (8) and (9), we note that the direct effect of a change in L̄, V̄ and D on war
efforts would be the same as that in Proposition 1. The indirect effect via changes in p are
given respectively by:
∂Ls dp ∂Ls dp
∂Ls dp
· a,
·
, and
·
,
a
∂p dL̄
∂p dV̄
∂p dD̄a
for the three endowments. That is, the endowment effect through changes in the international price on war effort is the product of two terms representing the effect of the price on
war effort and the effect of endowments on the price.
From (18), we know that ∂Ls /∂p > 0 when the non-numeraire good is labor intensive.
Furthermore, from (19) we find that dp/dL̄a , −dp/dV̄ a , and dp/dD are positive (negative)
a
>> 0 (<< 0). Note that when the terms of trade is exogenous, an increase in
if cay R2a − R12

endowments of land and disputed land and a decrease in undisputed land, increases warfare
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(see Proposition 1). Therefore, we are now able to ascertain if the presence of a terms-oftrade effect strengthens or weakens the results in Proposition 1. The results are stated below
as a proposition.

Proposition 3 Suppose that the two warring regions are labor intensive in the production
of the non-numeraire good. A sufficient condition for the results in Proposition 1 (the case
of small open economies) to be strengthened (weakened) because of the presence of a termsa
a
). This sufficient condition is reversed
(R2a cay << R12
of-trade effect is that R2a cay >> R12

when the two regions are land-intensive.

It is to be noted that the sufficient condition in Proposition 3 is about the size of
∂p/∂Ls (see (16)). That is, the terms of trade effect strengthens (weakens) the results for
the small open economy (Proposition 1) if the reduction in war efforts significantly increases
(decreases) the price of the non-numeraire good.
Let us now examine the condition R2 cy >> R12 more closely. This condition can
be rewritten as pcay >> ²ap , where ²ap = (∂R2a /∂p)(p/R2a ) is the price elasticity of wage rate
and pcay is the marginal propensity to spend the non-numeraire good. The terms pcay and
²ap represent respectively the the income effect and substitution effect. Thus, the sufficient
condition is a restriction on the size of the substitution effect relative to the income effect.

5

Conclusion

We examine the connection between conflict and resource endowments of two warring regions.
In the literature arguments have been put forth for either a positive relationship between
natural resources and conflict or a negative relationship. According to the Malthusian view,
scarcity of resources may lead to impoverishment and thus conflict. On the other hand,
abundance of resources may lead to ‘greed and opportunity’ and thus conflict (Collier-Hoeffler
hypothesis). A third channel via the work of the price mechanism has also been mentioned
15

as a cause of conflict (the Dutch-disease hypothesis). In this paper we have developed a
unified trade-theoretic model that synthesizes the different strands in the literature. In our
model, a Nash war equilibrium is established endogenously. Each region decides on its war
efforts equating marginal costs and benefits of war, taking war efforts of the other region as
given.
When the terms of trade is exogenous, we find generally that uncontested natural
resource scarcity increases conflict, but that conflict increases with the size of the contested
territory. While contested resource scarcity tends to lower the opportunity costs of warfare,
having more contested territory tends to also increase the marginal benefit of warfare. When
the terms of trade is endogenous, these results are either strengthened or weakened depending
on factor intensities in production and on the relative strength of income and substitution
effects.
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